Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND
DIVISION
|
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), Petitioner, - versus - INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS
CORPORATION (ICC), Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 141667 Present: PUNO, J.,
Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: |
x - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - x
D E C I S I O N
GARCIA,
J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, petitioner Republic, through the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC), seeks the annulment and setting aside of the Amended
Decision[1]
dated September 30, 1999 of the Court of Appeals (CA), setting aside the orders
dated June 4, 1996 and June 25, 1997 of the NTC insofar as said orders required
respondent International Communications Corporation (ICC) to pay the amount of P1,190,750.50
by way of permit fee as a condition for the grant of a provisional authority to
operate an international telecommunications leased circuit service, and the Resolution[2]
dated January 24, 2000, denying NTC's motion for reconsideration.
There is no dispute as to the facts:
On April 4, 1995, respondent ICC, holder of a
legislative franchise under Republic Act (RA) No. 7633 to operate
domestic telecommunications, filed with the NTC an application for a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity
to install, operate, and maintain an international telecommunications leased circuit
service between the Philippines and other countries, and to charge rates
therefor, with provisional authority for the purpose.
In an Order[3] dated
2. That applicant [ICC] shall pay a permit fee in the amount of P1,190,750.00,
in accordance with section 40(g) of the Public Service Act,[4] as amended;
Respondent ICC
filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the Order insofar as
the same required the payment of a permit fee. In a subsequent Order dated
Therefrom, ICC
went to the CA on a petition for certiorari with prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, questioning the
NTC's imposition against it of a permit fee of P1,190,750.50 as a condition for the grant of the provisional
authority applied for.
In its original decision[5] dated
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. In view thereof, the assailed orders dated
SO ORDERED.
In time, ICC moved for a reconsideration. This time, the CA, in its Amended Decision dated
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated
SO ORDERED. (Word in bracket added).
Petitioner NTC
filed a motion for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the CA in its
equally challenged Resolution dated
1.
NTC has
arrogated upon itself the power to tax an entity;
2.
Section
40(g) of the Public Service Act has been amended by Section 5(g) of R.A. 7925;[6]
3.
The
imposition of permit fees is no longer authorized by R.A. 7925; and
4.
The
imposed permit fee in the amount of P1,190,750.50 for
respondent's provisional authority is exorbitant.
Before addressing
the issues raised, we shall first dwell on the procedural matter raised by
respondent ICC, namely, that the present petition should be dismissed outright
for having been filed out of time. It is respondent's posture that petitioner's
motion for reconsideration filed with the CA vis-a-vis the latter's
Amended Decision is a pro forma motion and, therefore, did not toll the
running of the reglementary period to come to this Court via this petition for review.
Under Section 2 of Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, a recourse to this Court by way of a petition for review must
be filed within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial
of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time
after notice of the judgment. While a motion for reconsideration
ordinarily tolls the period for appeal, one that fails to point out the findings or
conclusions which were supposedly contrary to law or the
evidence does not have such
an effect on the
reglementary period as it is merely a pro
forma motion.[7]
In arguing for the
outright dismissal of this petition, respondent ICC claims that the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner NTC in connection with the CA’s Amended
Decision failed to point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the CA
which were supposedly contrary to law. Respondent contends that the issues
raised by the petitioner in its motion for reconsideration were mere reiterations of
the same
issues
which had already been considered and passed upon by the CA when it promulgated
its Amended Decision. On this premise,
respondent maintains that petitioner’s aforementioned motion for
reconsideration is a mere pro forma motion that did not toll the period for
filing the present petition.
Under established
jurisprudence, the mere fact that a motion for reconsideration reiterates issues
already passed upon by the court does not, by itself, make it a pro forma motion.[8] Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed is
precisely to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper,
contrary to the law or evidence; and in so doing, the movant has to dwell of
necessity on issues already passed upon. If a motion for reconsideration may
not discuss those issues, the consequence would be that after a decision
is rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing only motions for
reopening and new trial.[9]
Where there is no
apparent intent to employ dilatory tactics, courts should be slow in declaring
outright a motion for reconsideration as pro forma. The doctrine
relating to pro forma motions has a direct bearing
upon the movant's valuable right to appeal. Hence, if petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was indeed pro forma, it would still be
in the interest of justice to review the Amended Decision a quo on the merits,
rather than to abort the appeal due to a technicality, especially where, as here, the industry involved (telecommunications) is vested with public
interest. All the more so given that the instant petition raises some arguments that
are well-worth resolving for future reference.
This brings us to
the substantive merits of the petition.
In its Amended Decision, the CA ruled that
petitioner NTC had arrogated upon itself the power to tax an entity, which it
is not authorized to do. Petitioner disagreed, contending the fee in question is not in the
nature of a tax, but is merely a regulatory measure.
Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act
provides:
Sec. 40. The Commission is authorized and ordered to charge and collect from
any public service or applicant, as the case may be, the following fees as reimbursement of its expenses in the
authorization, supervision and/or regulation of the public services:
xxx xxx xxx
g) For each permit, authorizing the increase in equipment,
the installation of new units or authorizing the increase of capacity, or the
extension of means or general extensions in the services, twenty centavos for
each one hundred pesos or fraction of the additional capital necessary to carry
out the permit. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act is not a
tax measure but a simple regulatory provision for the collection of fees
imposed pursuant to the exercise of the State’s police power. A tax is imposed
under the taxing power of government principally for the purpose of raising
revenues. The law in question, however, merely authorizes and requires the
collection of fees for the reimbursement of the Commission's expenses in the
authorization, supervision and/or regulation of public services. There can be
no doubt then that petitioner NTC is authorized to collect such fees. However,
the amount thereof must be reasonably related to the cost of such supervision and/or
regulation.[10]
Petitioner NTC
also assails the CA's ruling that Section
40(g) of the Public Service Act had been amended by Section 5(g) of R.A. No. 7925, which reads:
Sec. 5. Responsibilities of the National Telecommunications
Commission. - The National Telecommunications Commission (Commission)
shall be the principal administrator of this Act and as such shall take the
necessary measures to implement the policies and objectives set forth in this
Act. Accordingly, in addition to its existing functions, the Commission shall
be responsible for the following:
xxx xxx xxx
g) In the exercise of its regulatory powers, continue to impose such fees and charges as
may be necessary to cover reasonable costs and expenses for the regulation and
supervision of the operations of telecommunications entities. (Emphasis supplied)
The CA
ratiocinated that while Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act (CA 146, as
amended), supra, allowed NTC to impose fees as reimbursement of
its expenses related to, among other things, the “authorization” of public
services, Section 5(g), above, of R.A. No. 7921 no longer speaks of “authorization” but only of
“regulation” and “supervision.” To the CA, the omission by Section 5(g) of
R.A. No. 7921 of the word
“authorization” found in Section
40(g) of the Public Service Act, as amended, meant that the fees which NTC may
impose are only for reimbursement of its expenses for regulation and
supervision but no longer for authorization purposes.
We find, however,
that NTC
is
correct in saying that there is no showing of legislative intent to repeal,
even impliedly, Section 40(g), supra, of the Public
Service Act, as amended. An implied repeal is predicated on a substantial
conflict between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a
subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior one unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of
the new and old laws.[11] The two laws must
be absolutely incompatible such that they cannot be made to stand together.[12]
Courts of justice,
when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes or provisions, should
endeavor to reconcile the same instead of declaring outright the validity of
one as against the other. Such alacrity should be avoided. The wise policy is
for the judge to harmonize such statutes or provisions if this is possible,
bearing in mind that they are equally the handiwork of the same legislature,
and so give effect to both while at the same time also according due respect to a coordinate department of the government. It is this
policy the Court will
apply in arriving at the interpretation of the laws and the conclusions that
should follow therefrom.[13]
It
is a rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not
favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the
two laws are so clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent with each other that they cannot co-exist. This is based on the rationale that the will of the legislature cannot be overturned by the
judicial function of construction and interpretation. Courts cannot take the place of Congress in repealing statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize, as much as possible,
seeming conflicts in the laws and resolve doubts in favor of their validity and
co-existence.[14]
Here, there does
not even appear to be a conflict between Section 40(g) of the Public
Service Act, as amended, and Section 5(g) of R.A. 7925. In fact, the latter
provision directs petitioner NTC to “continue to impose such fees and
charges as may be necessary to cover reasonable costs and expenses for the
regulation and supervision of telecommunications entities.” The absence alone
of the word “authorization” in Section 5(g) of R.A. No. 7921 cannot be
construed to mean that petitioner NTC had thus been deprived of the power to
collect such fees. As pointed out by the petitioner, the words “authorization,
supervision and/or regulation” used in Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act are not
distinct and completely separable concepts which may be taken singly or
piecemeal. Taken in their entirety, they are the quintessence of the
Commission's regulatory functions, and must go hand-in-hand with one another.
In petitioner's own words, “[t]he Commission authorizes, supervises and
regulates telecommunications entities and these functions... cannot be
considered singly without destroying the whole concept of the Commission's
regulatory functions.”[15] Hence, petitioner
NTC is correct in asserting that the passage of R.A. 7925 did not bring with it
the abolition of permit fees.
However, while
petitioner had made some valid points of argument, its position must, of necessity,
crumble on the fourth issue raised in its petition. Petitioner itself admits
that the fees imposed are
precisely regulatory and supervision fees,
and not
taxes.
This necessarily implies, however, that such fees must be commensurate
to the costs and expenses
involved in discharging its supervisory and regulatory functions. In the words
of Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act itself, the fees and charges which
petitioner NTC is authorized to collect from any public service or applicant are limited to the
“reimbursement of its expenses in the authorization, supervision and/or
regulation of public services.” It is difficult to comprehend how the cost of licensing, regulating, and surveillance
could amount to P1,190,750.50. The CA was correct in finding
the amount imposed as permit fee
exorbitant and in complete disregard of the basic limitation that the fee
should be at least approximately commensurate to the expense. Petitioner itself
admits that it had imposed the maximum amount possible under the Public Service
Act,
as amended. That is hardly taking into consideration the actual costs of
fulfilling its regulatory and supervisory functions.
Independent of the above, there is one basic consideration for the dismissal of this petition, about which petitioner NTC did not bother to comment at all. We refer to the fact
that, as respondent ICC
aptly observed, the principal ground given by the CA in striking down the imposition of the P1,190,750.50 fee is that respondent
ICC is entitled to the benefits of the so-called “parity clause” embodied in
Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925, to wit:
Section 23. Equality of Treatment in the Telecommunications
Industry. - Any advantage,
favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity granted under existing franchises, or
may hereafter be granted, shall ipso facto become part of previously granted
telecommunications franchises and shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the grantees of such franchises x x x.
In this
connection, it is significant to note that the subsequent congressional franchise granted to
the Domestic Satellite Corporation under Presidential Decree No. 947, states:
Section 6. In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby
granted, the grantee shall pay to the Republic of the Philippines during the
life of this franchise a tax of
one-half percent of gross
earnings derived by the grantee from its operation under this franchise and
which originate from the Philippines. Such tax shall be due and payable
annually within ten days after the audit and approval of the accounts by the
Commission on Audit as prescribed in Section 11 hereof and shall be in lieu of all taxes, assessments, charges,
fees, or levies of any kind, nature,
or description levied, established
or collected by any municipal, provincial, or national authority x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The CA was correct in ruling that the above-quoted provision
is, by law, considered as ipso facto part of ICC's franchise due to the “parity clause” embodied in Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925. Accordingly, respondent ICC
cannot be made subject to the payment of the subject fees because its payment of the franchise tax is
“in lieu” of all other taxes and fees.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Amended Decision and Resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S .PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by former Associate Justice
Demetrio G. Demetria, with Associate Justices Ramon A. Barcelona (ret.) and
Martin S. Villarama, Jr., concurring; Rollo, pp. 34-53.
[2] Rollo, p. 55.
[3] Rollo,
p. 65.
[4] Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended, “An Act to reorganize the Public Service Commission, prescribe its
powers and duties, define and regulate public services, provide and fix the
rates and quota of expenses to be paid by the same and for other purposes.”
[5] Rollo,
pp. 71-79.
[6] Republic Act No. 7925, “An Act to
promote and govern the development of Philippine telecommunications and the delivery of public telecommunications
services,” otherwise known as the
Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the
[7] Section 2, Rule
37 of The Rules of Court;
[8] Cruz v. Villaluz, G.R. No. L-41684, February 21,
1979, 88 SCRA 506; People v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 32657, September 1,
1992, 213 SCRA 171; Marina Properties Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 125447,
August 14, 1998, 294 SCRA 273.
[9] Guerra
Enterprises Co., Inc. v. CFI of Lanao del Sur, G.R. No. L-28310,
[10] PLDT v. Public
Service Commission, G.R. No. L-26762,
[11]
[12] Compania General de Tabacos
v. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8 [1924].
[13] Gordon
v. Meridiano,
G.R. No. L-55230,
[14] Ty v.
Trampe, G.R. No. 117577,
[15] Reply; Rollo, p. 141.